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1.0 Introduction 
To a large extent, the growth and development of every nation depends on tax revenue 
mobilisation. The  World Bank (1988) defines tax as a compulsory, unrequited payments 
made to the government by individuals, businesses or institutions. Globally, taxes play 
significant role in the economy at both micro and macro levels. Firstly, tax is the main source 
of central government revenue, since its collection is mandatory and regular. Secondly, taxes 
help governments to provide the social and public needs by providing public goods and 
services. Thirdly, governments need tax revenue to establish armed forces and judicial 
systems to ensure security and justice for the society (Aizenman et al. 2015).   
              Lee and Gordon (2005) reckon that taxes can also be a powerful means to achieving 
the goals of social progress and economic development. Taxes also serve as a tool for 
encouraging the growth of certain activities by way of giving exemptions; discourage use of 
certain products by way of imposing heavier charges like those taxes imposed on tobacco 
products; or strengthen anaemic enterprises through exemptions (Arnold, 2008). Moreover, 
local industries may be protected through taxation by imposing high custom duties on 
foreign goods. Taxes can also be used to reduce inequities or inequalities in wealth and 
income as in the case of estate and income tax. 
Several studies have contributed to the debate on the main determinants of tax revenue 
efforts around the world. Studies including but not limited to Gaalya (2015), Gupta (2007), 
Brafu-Insaidoo and Obeng (2008), Teera and Hudson (2004), Gupta et al. (2004), Martinez-
Vasquez and Torgler (2004), Tanzi (1981), and Chelliah (1992) have enumerated structural 
and institutional factors influencing tax revenue generation. Variables including GDP per 
capita, foreign aid, foreign direct investment, inflation, real exchange rate, trade openness, 
sectoral contribution to GDP, debt to GDP, corruption, rule of law among others have been 
widely explored as the main determinants of tax performance. For instance, Gaalya (2015) 
has shown that foreign aid impacts tax revenue negatively while Gupta (2007) and Brafu-
Insaidoo and Obeng (2008) provided evidence to show that GDP per capita induces revenue 
mobilisation efforts in Sub-Sahara Africa.   
One key factor that is yet to be explored in terms of the determinants of tax revenue 
is exchange rate volatility. So far, the empirical discourse generally focuses on the association 
between real exchange rate and tax revenue. For instance, Adam, Bevan and Chambas (2001) 
argued that a real depreciation of the real exchange rate is revenue inducing in Sub-Sahara 
Africa. Fierro and Reisen (1990) also provided evidence to show that a devaluation of the 
exchange rate has an overall positive effect on revenue generation in Korea and Mexico.  
Notwithstanding this, the literature is not exhaustive at least as these studies failed to 
explore the impact of the risk characterising the real exchange rate on tax revenue 
generation. A review of the literature shows that theoretical and empirical works are silent 
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on the subject matter. This is basically the void this study seeks to fill. According to Oztruk 
(2006), exchange rate volatility refers to the persistent up and down movements in the 
barter price of a country’s currency. In recent times, exchange rate has dominated the 
literature in international trade and finance particularly due to its effects on developing 
economies. Since volatility is not observed overtime, several methods, for instance, the 
moving average, the standard deviation method, as well as the Generalised Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroscedascity (GARCH) have been used to capture periodic volatilities in a country’s exchange rate.  
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998),  Calderón (2004), and  Hau (2002) have shown that 
exchange rate volatility is more pronounced in more open economies by asserting that the 
more volatile the exchange rate becomes, the riskier trade becomes impacting tax revenue 
adversely. According to Côté (1994), exchange rate volatility can affect trade directly, 
through uncertainty and adjustment costs, and indirectly, through its effect on the structure 
of output, investment and government policy. This suggests that in economies where 
exchange rate volatility persists, the degree of openness to trade or trade liberalisation 
policies could have a greater impact on revenue generation. As De Grauwe (1988) noted, 
exchange rate volatility can have a detrimental impact on trade and by extension, trade tax 
revenue depending on the degree of risk aversion of trade players. In small open economies 
like Ghana where forward contracts are less utilised by trade players, the overall implication 
of this is that exchange rate volatility can have a short-term and long-term impact on trade 
taxes. Even though flexible exchange rate is supposed to be self-correcting, at least 
theoretically, the long and slow adjustment period, in reality, could generate higher risk with 
deleterious effects on exports volumes and by extension trade tax revenue (De Vita & Abbot, 
2004). 
As Ghana continues to open up to trade, trade taxes could be mostly affected if volatility in the real exchange rate persists. Ghana’s heavy reliance on imports poses various 
challenges to the economy including exchange rate volatility. But is there evidence of 
exchange rate volatility in Ghana? Recent studies by Alagidede and Ibrahim (2017),  
Tarawalie, Sissoho, Conte, and Ahortor (2013), and Obeng (2018) provide evidence of high 
exchange rate volatility in Ghana and the West Africa Monetary Zone (WAMZ). Particularly, 
Alagidede and Ibrahim (2017) further provide evidence to support the claim that deviations resulting from shocks to Ghana’s exchange rate market take about 15 years to be corrected . 
The Ghana cedi has depreciated against its major trading currencies especially the US 
Dollar, although, not monotonously, as the Ghana cedi recorded some stability between 2002 
and 2007 (Alagidede &Ibrahim, 2017). Ghana redenominated her currency on July 1, 2007, 
where US$1 was exchanged for 93 pesewas. Following this move is a persistent depreciation 
of the cedi. For instance, the end of July 2009, US$ 1was exchanged for GH¢1.49. However, 
between August 2009 and March 2010, the Cedi marginally appreciated by 3%. Most 
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recently, the cedi has been very volatile. For instance, at the beginning of January 2014, a 
dollar was exchanged for GH¢2.21 and by the end of September 2014, the Cedi–Dollar 
exchange rate stood at GH¢3.20 – denoting about 44.65% depreciation (Alagidede & Ibrahim, 
2017). 
              Ghana’s tax revenue to GDP remains low at an average of 14 percent compared to 
Sub-Saharan African average of 18 percent. Generally, tax performance in the past decade 
has not been so encouraging as the country has barely improved on its total tax revenue to 
GDP of 17.5 percent realised in 2011. Below is a comparative analytical trend of overall tax 
revenue to the government from both domestic and international sources. 
(Figure 1) 
A careful look at Figure 1 reveals that the trends of overall tax-to-GDP, trade taxes, 
and aid performance have been largely unstable. For instance, trade taxes rose steadily from 
a little over 0.1 percent to 9 percent from 1984 to 1998. On Aid, receipt was also encouraging 
as it increased from 5 percent in 1984 to 16 percent in 2004 though there were significant 
fluctuations 1990, 1992, and 1997. Lastly, on tax to GDP, the trend was also encouraging as 
the trend basically increased from 9.7 percent in 1997 to 21.8 percent in 2004. Could this 
unstable trend in tax revenue be due to the risk associated with the real exchange rate?  
1.1 Motivation and Significance of the Study 
The motivation for the study lies in estimating the effect of exchange rate volatility on tax 
revenue in Ghana in a bid to informing policymakers on the impact of exchange rate volatility 
on revenue generation efforts. While anecdotally, volatility in the Ghana cedi has been 
attributed to macroeconomic instability, very little attempt has been made to explore its 
impact on revenue generation efforts. Generally, discussions surrounding the fluctuations in Ghana’s exchange rate are only gleaned from public discourses on the economy with very 
little empirical and theoretical content. Understanding the impact of exchange rate volatility 
on tax revenue is essentially an empirical question. First, the study contributes to the 
literature by informing policymakers on the responsiveness of tax revenue to a given degree 
of exchange rate volatility; second, the implication of trade liberalisation policies on tax 
revenue given exchange rate volatility. 
The rest of the article is presented as follows: section 2 focuses on the literature review while 
the model is discussed in section 3. The results and discussion are presented in Section 4. In 
Section 5, the conclusions and policy recommendations are presented. 
2.0 Literature Review             
The empirical link between exchange rate volatility and tax revenue generation is largely 
non-existent in the literature. The best the empirical literature offers is the effect of exchange 
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rate on tax revenue generation. For instance, Adam, Bevan and Chambas (2001) provide 
evidence to show that a real depreciation of the real exchange rate is revenue inducing in 
Sub-Sahara Africa. In most cases, the empirical relationship has been between exchange rate 
volatility and Trade (see Tatliyer and Yigit, 2016, in the case of United States; De Vita and 
Abbott, 2004, for Turkey; Tchokote, Uche and Agboola, 2015; and Tarawalie, Sissoho, Conte, 
and Ahortor, 2013, for WAMZ). 
3.0 Data Description and Sources  
The study used annual time series data spanning 1984 to 2014 to test the hypothesis that 
exchange rate volatility affects tax revenue generation. Following the empirical literature, 
the study explored the effect of exchange rate volatility together with GDP per capita, 
inflation, trade openness, industry, and foreign aid on tax revenue mobilisation in Ghana. 
The dependent variable, tax revenue (TR), was captured as a ratio of total tax revenue to GDP 
(Gaalya, 2015; and Gupta, 2007). GDP Per Capita (GPC) was measured by GDP per the total 
population. With theoretical foundation from the ability to pay theory, GDP per capita 
signifies a higher capacity of the populace to pay taxes as well as a greater capacity of 
policymakers to levy and collect them (Chelliah,1971). This is buoyed by increased demand 
for public expenditure and urbanization (Tanzi, 1987). Inflation (INF) was measured by the 
end of period inflation average. Tax revenue from inflation could rise mostly due to 
seigniorage, excessive borrowing and high unproductive expenditures as the populace in the 
formal sector are pushed into a high income bracket (Gupta, 2007). Trade openness (OPN) 
proxied by sum of total export and import to GDP matters for tax revenue performance as 
they take placed at specified places Gupta (2007); the choice of industrial contribution to 
GDP (IND) follows logic and empirical evidence as the industrial sector is less difficult to tax 
in developing countries (Gupta, 2007; Teera, 2004; Keen & Baunsgaard, 2005) while foreign 
aid (AID) captured as net official development assistance matters as tax performance may 
decline in the recipient country following aid (Franco-Rodriguez, Morrissey & McGillivray, 
1998; and Mahdavi, 2008). The data for all the variables were sourced from the World 
Development Indicators. 
 
3.1 Modeling Exchange Rate Volatility 
Since exchange rate volatility is not observable, it had to be generated. Following the 
literature, GARCH (1,1) by Bollerslev (1990) was used as it allows variances of errors in the 
exchange rate to be time dependent on time.  
               The GARCH (1,1) modeling process commences with mean equation (1) which 
expresses changes in the real effective exchange rate, 𝑅𝐸𝑅, as a function of its lagged value. 
The error term, 𝑒𝑡 is normally distributed with zero mean and a variance, ℎ𝑡 . The variance, ℎ𝑡is then used to specify the GARCH (1,1) model of interest as in equation (1). 
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∆(𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐸𝑅)𝑡  =  𝑐1 +  𝛽∆(𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐸𝑅)𝑡−1  +  𝑒𝑡                                        (1) 𝑒𝑡 ≈ N(0, ℎ𝑡) ℎ𝑡= 𝑐2 + 𝑒𝑡−12  + ℎ𝑡−1                                                     (2) 
where: ∆(𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐸𝑅)= difference log of the real effective exchange rate from period 𝑡 to 𝑡 − 1 ℎ𝑡 = variance of the error term et 𝑒𝑡−12 = the ARCH term ℎ𝑡−1= the GARCH term 
From equation 2, the variance equation has one ARCH term (i.e.𝜀𝑡−12 ) and one GARCH term ( ℎ𝑡−1). The dependent variable (ℎ𝑡) represents the conditional variance, α and β represent 
the lagged squared error term (ARCH effect) and conditional volatility (GARCH effect) 
respectively. 
 
3.2 The Model 
3.2.1 Theoretical foundation 
Theoretically, the link between exchange rate volatility and tax revenue is not clear. The 
study relied on the buoyancy theory of tax systems. The approach measures growth in duty 
revenue as a result of growth in income, reflecting the combined effects of tax base expansion 
and discretionary changes in tax rates, base definition, and changes in collection and 
enforcement of the law. Discretionary changes in the tax rate is often resorted following loss 
of international competitiveness and persistent volatility of the exchange rate (Brafu-
Insaidoo & Obeng, 2008). 
 
3.2.2 Empirical foundation 
Analysis of the existing literature by Bahl (1972), Lotz and Morss (1970), Gupta (2007), 
Stotsky and WoldeMariam (1997), Khattry and Rao (2002), and Tanzi and Blejer (1988) 
reveal that studies exploring tax revenue generation mostly used the behavioural approach. 
The approach regresses tax revenue on variables that serve as proxies for a country’s tax 
performance. We express the approach as follows: 
 𝑇𝑅 𝑌⁄ = 𝑓(K)                                                                (3) 
 
Where TR is tax revenue, Y is GDP, and K is a vector of tax handles. 
By adapting the functional models put forward by Gaalya (2015) and Le, Moreno-Dodson, 
and Rojchaichaninthorn (2008), the study specifies a model which expresses tax to GDP as 
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functionally related to the level of economic development and sophistication, and the degree 
of trade openness (see equation 4). 
 ln (𝑇𝑅/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑃𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝑂𝑃𝑁𝑡 +𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑋𝑉𝑡 + 𝛽7(𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑋𝑉 ∗ 𝑙𝑛𝑂𝑃𝑁)𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                        (4) 
where; 𝑙𝑛 is the natural log, TR is Tax to GDP ratio, 𝛽0 is tax intercept, GPC is Gross Domestic 
Product Per Capita, OPN is Trade Openness, IND is Industry output to GDP ratio, INF is 
Inflation rate, EXV is Exchange Rate Volatility, (𝐸𝑋𝑉 ∗ 𝑂𝑃𝑁) is Exchange Rate Volatility and 
Trade Openness interaction, while 𝜀 is the error term. 
3.2.3 Estimation Strategy 
To be able to capture the long-run and contemporaneous effects  of exchange rate volatility 
on tax revenue, the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) to cointegration technique put 
forward by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) was applied. We thus transform equation (4) 
into the ARDL form (see equation 5) ∆𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑅𝑡 = 𝛿0 + ∅𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛼1𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑃𝐶𝑡−1 +𝛼5𝑙𝑛𝑂𝑃𝑁𝑡−1 +  𝛼6𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑋𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝛼5(𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑋𝑉 ∗ 𝑙𝑛𝑂𝑃𝑁)𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽1𝜌𝑖=1 ∆𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑅𝑡−𝑖 +∑ 𝛽2𝜌𝑖=1 ∆𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽3𝜌𝑖=1 ∆𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽4𝜌𝑖=1 ∆𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽5𝜌𝑖=1 ∆𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑃𝐶𝑡−𝑖 +∑ 𝛽6𝜌𝑖=1 ∆𝑙𝑛𝑂𝑃𝑁𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽7𝜌𝑖=1 ∆𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑋𝑉𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽8𝜌𝑖=1 ∆(𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑋𝑉 ∗ 𝑙𝑛𝑂𝑃𝑁)𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡                                           
(5) 
Where,  ∅ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛼𝑖 represent the long-run elasticities while 𝛽𝑖  are the short-run elasticities. 
We then proceeded to estimate the results after establishing cointegration among the 
variables using the bounds testing approach. Lastly, the Granger causality test was 
performed to determine the predictive effects among exchange rate volatility, tax revenue 
and the control variables. 
4.0 Results and Discussion 
Descriptive statistics was presented to show the location, variability and the distribution of 
the data. The descriptive statistics shows that all the variables have positive average values 
but for exchange rate volatility and the interaction term for trade openness and exchange 
rate volatility (see Appendix A). For instance, the mean tax to GDP is approximately 14 
percent while the average inflation rate is also 22 percent. The average GDP per capita 
income of Ghanaians over the study period is also GHȻ 777. Also, the minimal deviation of 
the variables from their means as shown by the standard deviation gives indication of 
minimal variability of the data over the period under consideration.  
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4.1 Evidence of Real Exchange Rate Volatility in Ghana 
Appendices B and C show the result providing evidence of high and persistent volatility in Ghana’s exchange rate. The coefficient of the squared residuals for the series is significant at 
1 percent. The sum of α and β is approximately equal to 1 indicating that the volatility is 
highly persistent suggesting the presence of volatility clustering. This implies that the real 
exchange rate contains time varying effect, hence linear models cannot realistically explain 
its behavioural pattern. There is therefore a justification for adopting the GARCH (1,1) 
models for estimating the volatility in Ghana’s real exchange rate. Moreover, the ARCH [1] 
which is the serial LM test shows the absence of serial correlation in the residuals. 
4.2 Analysis on Tax to GDP and Exchange Rate Volatility  
A trend analysis of the tax to GDP and exchange rate volatility over the study period is shown 
in figure 2. 
(Figure 2) 
Figure 2 shows that from 2004, where the exchange rate was volatile upward, Ghana’s tax to 
GDP was as high as 21.8 percent. This was very encouraging but the figure reduced sharply 
to 12.8 percent in 2006 before rising to 13.8 percent in 2008. In the period 2008 to 2014, 
where the volatility of the exchange rate seems prevalent, tax to GDP fell from 13.8 percent 
in 2008 to 12.6 percent in 2009 and increased thereof to 16.7 percent in 2012 before 
declining to 15.1 percent in 2013. This clearly shows that there is some form of dependency of Ghana’s tax performance on exchange rate volatility. 
4.3 Unit root tests 
As advised by Dickey and Fuller (1979), and Phillips and Perron (1988), the statistical 
properties of the variables were determined. The results of the ADF and PP tests for unit root 
with intercept and trend are provided in Appendices D and E respectively. The null 
hypothesis is that the series is non-stationary, or contains a unit root. The rejection of the 
null hypothesis is based on the MacKinnon (1996) critical values. The results revealed that 
all the variables were either integrated of order zero, I(0), or order one, I(1). Since the test 
results confirmed the absence of I(2) variables, the ARDL technique was thus appropriate  
for the estimation. 
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4.4 Bounds Test for Cointegration 
Table 1: Bounds test results for cointegration 
Critical Value Bound of the F-statistic: intercept and no trend 
K                90% Level                          95% Level                         99% Level                     
                I(0)             I(1)                 I(0)                I(1)               I(0)               I(1)  
7             1.92            2.89                2.17               3.21              2.73              3.9    
F-Statistics: FLTR(LTR|LINF,LGPC,LIND,LAID,LEXV, LEXVOPN,LOPN)= 5.3784**      
Source: Authors’ Computation 
From Table 1, the F-statistics that the joint null hypothesis of lagged level variables is zero 
was rejected at 5 percent level of significance. Since the calculated F-statistics of 
approximately 5.4 exceeded the upper bound’s critical value of (3.2), there is an evidence of 
cointegration among the variables.  
4.5 Long-run and Short-run Results 
Table 2: Effect of Exchange Rate Volatility on Tax Revenue 
Variable                                            Short Run Estimates                       Long-run Estimates                                                   
Inflation                                             0.0478*                                                    0.0335     
                                                            (0.0250)                                                  (0.0445) 
Industry                                            0.4956***                                                0.8480*** 
                                                            (0.0946)                                                  (0.1559) 
Foreign aid                                     0.2430***                                                 0.2265***  
                                                            (0.0491)                                                   (0.0571) 
Per Capita Income                         0.6837*                                                    0.6227*** 
                                                            (0.3582)                                                   (0.1458) 
Trade Openness                             -0.3734**                                                 -0.3078**  
                                                            (0.1575)                                                   (0.1104) 
Exchange Rate Volatility              -0.5433***                                                -0.8546***  
                                                             (0.1206)                                                   (0.2649) 
Exchange Rate Volatility*Trade  
Openness                                          0.0077***                                               0.0132*** 
                                                            (0.0014)                                                  (0.0033) 
Constant                                                       -                                                     -4.0153***    
                                                                                                                               (1.1242) 
ECT(-1)                                              -0.9377***                                                   - 
                                                              (0.1170)                                                      - 𝑅2                                                         0.9118                                                          -  
Adjusted 𝑅2                                        0.8580                                                          -  
DW Statistic                                       1.9605                                                          - 
10 
 
Note: LTR is the Dependent Variable. ***, ** and * denotes 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance 
respectively. 
Source: Authors’ Computation 
4.5.1 Long-Run Results 
From the standard regression statistics in Table 2, approximately 86 percent of the 
variations in tax revenue is explained by the independent variables. Also, a DW-statistics of 
approximately 1.96 reveals that there is no autocorrelation in the residuals. The coefficient 
of the lagged error correction term ECT (-1) exhibits the expected negative sign and is 
statistically significant at 1 percent. It is evident that approximately 94 percent of the disequilibrium caused by previous year’s shocks converges back to the long-run equilibrium 
in the current year. 
              The long-run results reveal that exchange rate volatility is detrimental to tax revenue 
generation in Ghana. The coefficient of exchange rate volatility is negative and statistically 
significant at 1 percent suggesting that 1 percent increase in exchange rate volatility leads to 
approximately 0.85 percent shortfall in tax revenue. As argued by Obeng (2018) and De 
Grauwe (1988), the result has theoretical underpinning in that the more volatile the 
exchange rate, the riskier trade becomes and for small open economy like Ghana, its 
consequence is felt on tax revenue. The implication of this is that it behoves the monetary 
authorities to stabilise the barter price of the cedi as the country risks losing tax revenue. 
             We provide evidence to show that in the presence of exchange rate volatility, the more 
the Ghana liberalises trade, the more the country loses tax revenue.   𝐿𝑇𝑅 = −4.0153 + 0.0335𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐹 + 0.8480𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 0.2265𝐿𝐴𝐼𝐷 + 0.6227𝐿𝐺𝑃𝐶 −0.3078𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑁 − 0.8546𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑉 + 0.0132(𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑉 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑁)  𝜕(𝐿𝑇𝑅)𝜕(𝑑𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑁) = −0.3078 + 0.0132𝐸𝑋𝑉, from the descriptive statistics, 𝐸𝑋𝑉 = -0.0993 𝜕(𝐿𝑇𝑅)𝜕(𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑁) = −0.3078 + 0.0132(−0.0993) 𝜕(𝐿𝑇𝑅)𝜕(𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑁) = −0.3091  
The result suggests that given exchange rate volatility, policies that aim at liberalising Ghana’s trade is harmful to tax revenue generation. We show that in the presence of 
exchange rate volatility, a 1 percent increase in trade openness leads to approximately 0.31 
percent decline in tax revenue.  The test for the joint significance is statistically significant at 
5 percent (see Appendix F). Plausibly, for developing countries like Ghana whose trade 
receipts are mainly from primary products, frequent misalignment of the exchange given the 
fairly elastic nature of its products leads to some marginal shortfall in tax revenue. 
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             On the contrary, it is evident that a 1 percent increase in exchange rate volatility given trade openness affects Ghana’s tax revenue generation.  𝐿𝑇𝑅 = −4.0153 + 0.0335𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐹 + 0.8480𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 0.2265𝐿𝐴𝐼𝐷 + 0.6227𝐿𝐺𝑃𝐶 −0.3078𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑁 − 0.8546𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑉 + 0.0132(𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑉 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑁)  𝜕(𝐿𝑇𝑅)𝜕(𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑉) = −0.8546 + 0.0132𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑁, from the descriptive statistics, 𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑁 = 2.2729 𝜕(𝐿𝑇𝑅)𝜕(𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑉) = −0.8546 + 0.0132(2.2729) 𝜕(𝐿𝑇𝑅)𝜕(𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑉) = −0.8246  
We provide statistical evidence to shows that a 1 percent increase in exchange rate volatility 
in the presence of trade openness results in approximately 0.8 percent decline in tax 
revenue. The result brings to the fore the effect of exchange rate volatility on tax revenue due 
to the risk it imposes on trade players as argued by Obeng (2018). 
            We found an unconventional result for trade openness. We found that trade openness 
has a suppressing effect on tax revenue generation in Ghana. The result is statistically 
significant at 5 percent corroborating that of Gupta (2007) who found that a reduction in 
tariff rates are associated with reduction in tax revenue. In addition, Keen and Simone (2004) 
argued that other than reduction in tariff rates, revenue may increase provided trade 
liberalisation occurs through tariffication of quotas, eliminations of exemptions, reduction 
in tariff peaks and improvement in customs procedure. The import of this is that policies 
aimed at further liberalising Ghana’s trade can be harmful to revenue generation. This could 
be curtailed by scrutinising trade agreements, discouraging corruption at the custom 
divisions through better conditions of service and prosecution.  
We found foreign aid to have a positive effect on tax revenue mobilisation. There is a 
statistical evidence that an increase in foreign aid by 1 percent improves tax revenue by 0.23 
percent. Gupta et al. (2004) pointed out that advanced countries can help improve resource 
mobilisation efforts of developing countries by ensuring that aid flows are channelled into 
poverty reduction and infrastructural development due to its potency of generating higher 
future incomes. The result is in line with that of Benedek, Crivelli, Gupta and Muthoora 
(2014) and Clist (2010) who found that concessional loans are associated with higher 
domestic revenue mobilization.              
As expected, per capita income proved revenue inducing. We find that a 1 percent 
increase in per capita income improves revenue generation by approximately 0.62 percent, 
ceteris paribus. The finding concurs that of Chelliah (1971), Teera and Hudson (2004), Gupta 
(2007), and Brafu-Insaidoo and Obeng (2008). Gupta (2007) particularly argues that rising 
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levels of per capita income is associated with higher levels of tax revenue generation due to 
improved capacity of the state to levy and collect them arising from improved economic 
status of the populace, high demand for public services, and urbanization. 
             Finally, the contribution of the industrial sector to GDP has a significant favourable 
influence on tax revenue mobilisation. The result illustrates an increase in tax revenue of 
approximately 0.85 percent if there is a 1 percent increase in the share of industrial 
contribution to GDP. In developing countries like Ghana, manufacturing enterprises are 
easier to tax since business owners typically keep better books of accounts and records. The 
result supports that of Agbeyegbe, Stotsky and WoldeMariam (2006), and Ahmed and 
Muhammad (2010) in which the latter concludes that the manufacturing sector of 
developing countries has positive impact on of tax collection. Companies are required by law 
to provide records of accounts and pay all taxes of time. The implication of this is that the 
establishment of new enterprises, sustainability of existing firms, and support for 
manufacturing industries has the potency of improving tax revenue performance. 
4.5.2 Short-Run Results 
The relationship between the explanatory variables and tax revenue followed that of the 
long-run results.  The coefficient of exchange rate volatility is negative and statistically 
significant at 1 percent. Relatively, the result is less pronounced in the short-run. Plausibly, 
in the short-run, since transactions have already been agreed on, even in the presence of 
exchange rate volatility, substantial amount of flow of goods and services across borders still 
take place. However, as the volatility persists for a long time, high adjustment cost induce 
trade players focus on domestic consumers or reduce the amount of goods exported or 
imported or both.  
To conformity to the long-run results, we provide evidence to show that the more the 
country liberalises its trade with the rest of the world, the more the country loses tax 
revenue.  𝑑𝐿𝑇𝑅 = 0.0478𝑑𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐹 + 0.4956𝑑𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 0.2430𝑑𝐿𝐴𝐼𝐷 + 0.6837𝑑𝐿𝐺𝑃𝐶 −0.3734𝑑𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑁 − 0.5433𝑑𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑉 + 0.0077𝑑𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑉 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑁  𝜕(𝑑𝐿𝑇𝑅)𝜕(𝑑𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑁) = −0.3734 + 0.0077𝐸𝑋𝑉, from the descriptive statistics, 𝐸𝑋𝑉 = -0.0993 𝜕(𝑑𝐿𝑇𝑅)𝜕(𝑑𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑁) = −0.3734 + 0.0077(−0.0993) 𝜕(𝑑𝐿𝑇𝑅)𝜕(𝑑𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑁) = −0.3742  
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The test for the joint significance (see Appendix G) means that the net effect is statistically 
significant at 1 percent. This means that in a presence of exchange rate volatility, a 1 percent 
increase in trade openness leads to approximately 0.37 percent loss in tax revenue.  
In the same way, we show from the net-effect that given the level of trade openness, 
an increase in exchange rate volatility affects tax revenue generation adversely.  𝑑𝐿𝑇𝑅 = 0.0478𝑑𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐹 + 0.4956𝑑𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 0.2430𝑑𝐿𝐴𝐼𝐷 + 0.6837𝑑𝐿𝐺𝑃𝐶 −0.3734𝑑𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑁 − 0.5433𝑑𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑉 + 0.0077𝑑𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑉 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑁  𝜕(𝑑𝐿𝑇𝑅)𝜕(𝑑𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑉) = −0.5433 + 0.0077𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑁, but from the descriptive statistics,  𝐿𝑂𝑃𝑁 = 2.2729 𝜕(𝑑𝐿𝑇𝑅)𝜕(𝑑𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑉) = −0.3734 + 0.0077(2.2729)  𝜕(𝑑𝐿𝑇𝑅)𝜕(𝑑𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑉) = −0.3559  
The result is statistically significant at 5 percent (see Appendix G). The finding concurs that 
of Obeng (2018) who showed that exchange rate volatility is a risk factor to trade. This in 
effect, has a deleterious impact on tax revenue. 
              Consistent with long-run results, the contribution of the industrial sector to GDP, GDP 
per capita, foreign aid and inflation proved tax revenue inducing at various levels of 
significance while trade openness has a statistically suppressing effect on tax revenue at 5 
percent level of significance.  
4.6 Diagnostic Tests  
Table 3: Diagnostic Tests                                              
Test                                    F/Chi Version                                              P-Value                                     
Serial Correlation                 1.8750                                                         0.1855 
Functional Form                   1.0735                                                         0.3147 
Normality                                0.3146                                                         0.8544      
Heteroscedasticity               0.6768                                                          0.7427  
CUSUM                                          -                                                                 Stable 
CUSUMSQ                              -                                                                 Stable 
Source: Authors’ Computation 
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It is evident from Table 3 that the estimated model passes all the diagnostic tests 
indicating that the model is a fit of the data. It is clear that the model passes the test of 
misspecification, heteroscedasticity, normality and serial correlation. Moreover, Appendix H 
depicts the plots of CUSUM and CUSUMSQ for the estimated ARDL model. The plots suggest 
the stability of the coefficients meaning that the coefficients are not changing systematically 
or erratically. 
To examine the predictability of exchange rate volatility on tax revenue, the Granger 
(1988) causality test was conducted to determine the linear causation among the variables 
(see Appendix I). The results suggest a unidirectional causality from exchange rate volatility 
to tax revenue. Moreover, the results show a unidirectional causality from the share of 
industry in GDP to tax revenue. Lastly, a unidirectional causality from tax revenue to foreign 
aid was found.  
5.0 Conclusion and Recommendation 
The study set out to test the hypotheses that exchange rate volatility has both short-run and 
long-run impact on tax revenue generation in Ghana using annual data spanning 1984 to 
2014. In order to estimate the long-run relationship as well as the contemporaneous effects, 
the ARDL bounds testing technique to cointegration was employed.  
            Both the long-run and short-run results found statistically significant positive effects 
of per capita income, foreign aid and the share of the industrial sector to GDP on tax revenue 
generation. Inflation was positive and statistically significant only in the short-run. However, 
exchange rate volatility, and the net effect of exchange rate volatility and trade openness 
interaction proved tax revenue hindering both in the short-run and long-run.  
            On macroeconomic stability and particularly on real exchange rate, one policy 
implication of the finding is that, domestically, the Bank of Ghana should step-up its exchange 
rate stabilisation efforts to reduce exchange rate risk imposed on trade players. Moreover, 
the Bank of Ghana should sensitize trade players on the need to patronise hedging or forward 
contracts. This will go a long way to ensure steady flow of trade and international trade taxes 
              Coming from the background of the contribution of the industrial sector to tax 
revenue, it is recommended that, as a way of improving tax revenue, the government should 
create an enabling environment for the private sector to expand and/or establish new small 
or medium scale enterprises. The ripple effect of this on the industrial sector and the 
economy as a whole will further improve tax revenue performance  
              The significant negative relationship between trade openness and tax revenue 
suggests that policies aimed at further liberalising trade will be harmful to revenue 
generation. The study recommends that the Government of Ghana through the Ministries of 
Trade and Finance should take steps to review trade agreements like the Interim Economic 
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Partnership Agreement (I-EPA) that seeks to open the Ghanaian economy to the rest of the 
world.  
            In our future endeavours, the study will explore the effect of exchange rate volatility 
on tax revenue mobilization efforts in the WAMZ 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
 TR INF IND AID GPC OPN EXV EXV*OPN 
Mean  14.375  22.177  23.325  8.5919  777.07  69.426 -0.0993 -4.8671 
Median  13.877  18.031  26.558  9.5685  721.21  71.594 -0.1286 -7.2928 
Max  21.752  59.461  28.938  16.338  1251.4  116.04  0.6766  67.446 
Min  9.6980  8.7268  11.153  2.8631  551.63  18.814 -0.6229 -50.209 
Std.Dev.  2.8331  12.529  5.3438  3.5785  198.40  25.308  0.3097  24.043 
Skew  0.9502  1.1320 -0.5079  0.1557  1.0966 -0.1477  0.3961  0.6616 
Kurtosis  3.6064  3.8368  1.8252  2.0498  3.2302  2.1498  2.9153  4.3203 
J. Bera  5.1400  7.5253  3.1156  1.2913  6.2815  1.0463  0.8202  4.5136 
Prob  0.0765  0.0232  0.2105  0.5243  0.0432  0.5926  0.6635  0.1046 
Sum  445.63  687.50  723.08  266.34  24089  2152.2 -3.0811 -150.88 
Ss Dev.  240.80  4709.7  856.71  384.17 
 118097
2 19215.8  2.8790  17342 
Obs  31  31  31  31  31  31  31  31 
Note: SS Dev. represents Sum of Squared Deviation, Std Dev. represents Standard Deviation, 
J. Bera represents Jarque Bera, Prob represents Probability, Skew represents Skewness  
while Obs stands for Observation.  
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APPENDIX B: ARCH Test Result on Real Effective Exchange Rate 
SERIES            ARCH              F-Statistics      R-Squared        P-Values 
               RESID^2    
RER (-1)           0. 9166***         4872.17             359.51              0.0000        
ARCH [1]                                    0.0556               0.0559              0.8137 
Note: *** implies 1% level of significance while ARCH [1] is the ARCH LM test. 
 
 
APPENDIX C: GARCH (1, 1) Results for Volatility in the Exchange Rate 
Variable              Coefficient         Std. Error                   Z-Statistic    Prob 
CONS                    0.0001                 2.17E-05                    5.1166           0.0000 ARCH (α )            0.4597***            0.0727                        6.3233          0.0000  GARCH (β)          0.5869***             0.0417                       14.057          0.0000  (α + β)                   1.0466 
Note: *** implies 1% level of significance.      
 
APPENDIX D: Results of Unit Root Test with Trend and constant: ADF Test                              
                  Level                                                                        First Difference 
Variables   ADF-Statistics      Lag     Variables        ADF-Statistics         Lag   I(0, 1)  
LTR          -2.4886[0.1281]       1        ∆LTR           -7.3034[0.0000]***   0      I(1) 
LOPN       -2.0136[0.2797]       1        ∆LOPN        -5.0645[0.0003]***   1     I(1) 
LINF        -3.4767[0.0159]**   1   ∆LINF          -4.5805[0.0012]***    0     I(0) 
LIND        -3.0981[0.0375]**   1       ∆LIND         -6.3926[0.0000]***    0      I(0) 
LAID        -1.08972[0.7066]     1       ∆LAID         -5..3079[0.0002]***   0      I(1) 
LGPC        3.5970[1.0000]       1        ∆LGPC        -3.0170[0.0450]***    1      I(1) 
EXV         -4.3886[0.0016]*** 0        ∆EXV           -7.3652[0.0000]***   1      I(0) 
EXV*OPN -5.0013[0.0003]***1      ∆EXVOPN   -8.3097[0.0000]***    0      I(0)                                    
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APPENDIX E: Results of Unit Root Test with constant and trend: PP Test 
                  Levels                                                                        First Difference 
Variables   PP-Statistics         BW         Variables        PP-Statistics            BW   I(0,1)  
LTR          -3.1706[0.1093]      2         ∆LTR           -7.4866[0.0000]***    4      I(1) 
LOPN       -1.3894[0.8434]      3         ∆LOPN        -3.5787[0.0495]***    3      I(1) 
LINF        -4.0251[0.0186]**  11    ∆LINF          -15.7639[0.0001]*** 28     I(0) 
LIND       -2.8745[0.1842]       1         ∆LIND          -6.1668[0.0001]***    2     I(1) 
LAID        -1.7776[0.6903]      5         ∆LAID          -6.2502[0.0001]***    5      I(1) 
LGPC        0.4542[0.9986]      2          ∆LGPC         -3.7210[0.0368]***    2      I(1) 
LEXV       -4.1935[0.0127]**  7         ∆𝐿EXV         -19.858[0.0000]***    28    I(0) 
LEXV*OPN -4.8953[0.0024]***5    ∆𝐿EXVOPN  -24.3537[0.0000]*** 28     I(0)                                    
Note: ***, **, * indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis of non- stationary at 1%, 5%, 10% 
level of significance respectively, Δ denotes the first difference, BW is the Band Width and I(0) 
is the lag order of integration. The values in parenthesis are the P-values. 
 
APPENDIX F: Test for Joint Significance on Trade Openness – Exchange Rate Volatility 
Interaction (Short Run) 
F-statistic           4.4600            Prob. F(2,23)             0. 0230** 
Note: ** implies 5% level of significance.  
 
APPENDIX G: Test for Joint Significance on Exchange Rate Volatility –Trade Openness 
Interaction (Long Run) 
F-statistic          5.8100            Prob. F(2,23)             0. 0091*** 
Note: *** implies 1% level of significance.  
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APPENDIX H 
a. Plot of CUSUM 
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b. Plot of CUSUMSQ 
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APPENDIX I: Results of Pair-Wise Granger Causality Tests 
Null Hypothesis                                                   F-Statistics        Probability 
EXV does not Granger Cause LTR          4.0206         0.0312** 
LTR does not Granger Cause EXV                    1.1196         0.3429 
LAID does not Granger Cause LTR                    0.2174         0.8061 
LTR does not Granger Cause LAID                    3.3475         0.0522* 
LIND does not Granger Cause LTR                      3.0231                0.0675* 
LTR does not Granger Cause LIND                    1.0738         0.3575 
LINF does not Granger Cause LTR                    0.6224         0.5451 
LTR does not Granger Cause LINF                    1.4488         0.2547 
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
Source: Authors’ computation  
